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1 Introduction
Easterly (2003) has succinctly described Pakistan’s
50-year development experience as the paradox of
growth without development. This paradox is in
recognition of the fact that Pakistan’s successful
performance has not been able to translate into
meaningful social development for a majority of its
citizens. Pakistan has been the fastest growing
country in the region during the past 50 years and
its growth rates have been more in line with East
Asian than with South Asian economies (Figure 1).
However, there is a stark contrast between Pakistan’s
growth success and its social development failure.
Pakistan ranks 135 out of 177 countries on the 2005
Human Development Index (UNDP 2005). It has
consistently under-performed, relative to
comparative economies at similar income levels,
across a range of social development indicators
(Easterly 2003). For example, during its first 50 years,
compared with economies at similar income levels,
Pakistan had 20 per cent fewer elementary school-
age children enrolled in primary schools and 24 per
cent more of its population is illiterate relative to
comparative economies. Furthermore, the primary
and secondary education enrolment shortfall is
largely explained by a massive shortfall in female
enrolment. Similarly, 23 per cent fewer of Pakistan’s
population have access to sanitation relative to
comparative countries and the sanitation shortfall is
acute both in rural and urban areas (Easterly
2003: 442–7).
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Much of this failure has been blamed on little
financial outlay by the state for social services and on
a lack of prioritisation for service delivery (e.g.
education, heath services), due in large part to
disproportionately large spending on defence and
debt repayment. Recent literature also sees
Pakistan’s poor social development outcomes as a
consequence of the political and administrative
structures that weakened political and bureaucratic
accountability to citizens and resulted in political
economy and governance failures. These structures
were characterised by: (a) centralisation,
(b) bureaucratisation, and (c) clientelist politics, and
under this system, which persisted through both
military and civilian regimes, most decisions
regarding service delivery, including budgetary
allocations, were in the hands of the provincial and
federal governments. Local governments (functioning
under the military regimes of Ayub and Zia
(1958–1969 and 1977–1988 respectively), were not
empowered and had extremely limited fiscal and
administrative mandates (AERC 1990). It is argued
that centralisation resulted in a lack of accountability
for three reasons. First, centralised service delivery
and budgetary decisions created a large distance
between citizens and key decision-makers, which
weakened the ability of the former to monitor the
actions of the latter. This factor was compounded by
the absence of spatial budgeting in the old system.
Budgets were prepared under a functional
classification, which did not reveal the spatial
allocation of funds and made it hard for areas and
localities to monitor the efficiency and equity of
these decisions. 
The second cause of accountability failure identified
by the literature was the bureaucratisation of service
delivery. The majority of services were delivered
through the deconcentrated provincial bureaucracy
that was not electorally accountable to citizens. It
was, instead, directly accountable to the higher tier
provincial bureaucracy and only indirectly accountable
to the provincial politicians. This created a disjuncture
between service providers and citizens, weakening
the accountability of the former to the latter.
The third cause of accountability failures lay in the
political system, which, according to the literature,
was based on a system of administrative
patrimonialism and political clientelism that led to
the personalisation of politics in the hands of
historically entrenched elites. In this case, national
and provincial politicians negotiated with local level
patrons to provide votes and other benefits, which
were purchased through the diversion of
development funds from the provincial and federal
levels (Gazdar 2000). The real political bargaining
game over the distribution of development funds
occurred not between citizens and their elected
representatives but, rather, between local patrons
and the higher-tier elected politicians and the
provincial bureaucracy, and between the state and
politicians.
In 2000, the new military regime of General
Musharraf announced local government reforms,
operationalised as the Local Government Ordinance
2001 (LGO 2001), which appeared to recognise these
accountability failures. The LGO 2001 sought to
redesign political, electoral and administrative
structures at the local level to increase the
accountability of service providers to local citizens. 
However, have these reforms been effective in
improving the magnitude and quality of provision of
essential public services? This article attempts to
explore the answer to this question by looking at
survey data on the post-reform provision and quality
of education and health services in four villages of
Punjab. Since there is no pre-reform baseline data on
service quality available for these villages, the field
study sought to evaluate change through
respondents’ perception of pre- and post-reform
provision and quality in 2004, i.e. three years after
the reforms had been instituted in each province.
Besides the data that our research team was able to
collect in these four villages, this article also
incorporates the findings of an extensive, Pakistan-
wide social audit carried out in the same year by
Cockcroft et al. (2005), which tracks improvements
in service delivery. This survey was able to track
changes because of a baseline that had been set up
through a similar social audit carried out in 2001/2
(Cockcroft et al. 2002). Together, the field study and
the social audit should help us get a clear picture of
the changes in service delivery after the
implementation of LGO 2001. 
However, before examining the impact of the local
government reforms, this article first outlines the
main changes introduced by LGO 2001 to address
the accountability failures that have been held
responsible for Pakistan’s poor performance in terms
of social development. 
2 Local Government Ordinance 2001 (LGO 2001)
LGO 2001 is a dramatic and far-reaching political
reform. Through a central ruling, the 200-year-old
colonial system of bureaucratic control over districts
by the first two tiers of government was swiftly
replaced by an elected third tier that connected
110 district governments, through 334 tehsil (rural) and
62 town (urban) governments, to 6,125 union
governments in the four provinces of Pakistan. Within
one year, 114,418 new elected offices were created in
the country at the union level, 3,264 at the tehsil level
and 2,782 at the district level,1 of which 40,108 are
reserved for women, another 36,734 are reserved for
labourers and peasants and 6,624 are reserved for
religious minorities.2 The plan, therefore, significantly
enlarged the electoral arena and allowed previously
marginalised groups into the equation.
The new three-tiered local government system is
based on both direct and indirect elections.3 Union
Administration represents the lowest tier, Tehsil/Town
Municipal Administration (TMA) represents the
intermediary level and District Government
represents the highest tier of local government. A
nazim and a deputy naib nazim lead each tier. LGO
2001 decentralised service delivery and planning to
the district, tehsil and union governments, instituted
representative democracies at each level, placed the
local bureaucracy under elected nazims at the district
level, and created new mechanisms for citizen
participation. The main objective of the reform was
to re-orient ‘the administrative system to allow public
participation in decision-making’ and ‘the essence of
this system is that the local governments are
accountable to citizens for all their decisions’. Besides
this, it also sought to create ‘one line of authority’
that led downwards from the district nazim and made
the local bureaucracy accountable to elected
representatives at the local level (NRB 2000).
The plan, thus, managed to empower elected
officials vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, brought planning
processes and service delivery mechanisms closer to
the people and increased the electoral
empowerment of women, minorities and peasants
(Cheema and Mohmand 2003). The plan also claimed
to be ‘participatory’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘people-
centred’ and promised to increase citizen voice in
government decision-making processes (NRB 2000). 
A historical analysis of decentralisation in Pakistan,
however, reveals that local government reforms have
not in the past been instituted to empower citizens or
to improve service delivery. They have, instead, been
instituted by military governments in order to create a
loyal cadre of local politicians willing to support the
continuation of military rule and the centralisation of
political power. A comparison of the current reforms
with those implemented by the military regimes of
Generals Ayub and Zia reveal enough similarities in
substance to make it possible to postulate that these
reforms too may be a ‘complementary institutional
change in a non-representative institution’s bid for
centralisation of political power’ (Cheema and
Mohmand 2003: 26). Such an analysis, however, is
beyond the scope of the current discussion. What
concerns us for now is the impact of local government
reforms on the provision and quality of education and
health services, and to this end, it is important to look
next at the specific ways in which LGO 2001 sought
to deal with the accountability failures discussed above. 
3 LGO 2001 and accountability failures
According to Charlton et al. (2003: 11–12), the
LGO 2001 attempts to overcome the accountability
failures described above by:
z injecting new blood into a political system
considered to be the domain of historically
entrenched interests
z providing positive measures enabling marginalised
citizens – women, workers, peasants – to access
formal politics
z introducing a measure of stability into a turbulent
political scene by creating a stronger line of
accountability between new politicians and local
electorates.
In order to achieve these objectives a number of
changes have been instituted in the structure of the
law and the state. First, key provincial functions have
been devolved to the district and tehsil levels so that
budgeting, planning and development functions that
were previously performed by provincial secretariats
have been transferred to the district and tehsil levels.
The scope of district governments has been increased
through the devolution of services, such as primary
and secondary education, primary healthcare and
planning and designing of roads and buildings, while
services provided by the Housing, Urban Development
and Public Health Engineering departments have been
devolved to the tehsil level. This reform in itself has
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significantly reduced the gap between service
providers and citizens, which is expected to improve
accountability through better citizen monitoring.
Second, provincial line departments at the district
and tehsil levels have been placed under the authority
of elected governments at these levels. This has
significantly empowered the local level elected tier
and created a new form of accountability for the
provincial bureaucracy. Thus, the local level
bureaucracy, which was previously accountable to
unelected provincial bureaucrats, is now accountable
to an elected representative of the citizens. 
Third, local government reforms have also provided
for institutional arrangements that foster citizen
participation in service delivery and oversight. Bodies
such as the Citizens Community Board (CCB) and the
Village and Neighbourhood Council (VNC) have been
created to enable citizens to directly participate in
service delivery. Oversight bodies, such as School
Committees, have been created to empower citizens
as ‘users’ by giving them the authority to monitor
and supervise local service providers. Both types of
bodies have the potential to increase the
accountability of government service providers to the
needs of citizens (Table 1).
Finally, the strengthening of the directly elected
union council as a foundation of the local state
means that the old local level unelected patron may
now be exposed to electoral competition and, thus,
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Table 1 Citizen participation and oversight bodies
Composition Elections Functions and responsibilities
Village and A total of 5–11 Independently elected zDevelopment and provision of water
Neighbourhood members, 1 seat council under the and sanitation facilities
Councils (VNCs) reserved for female supervision of TMA. zOrganise cultural and recreational 
representative and 1 Headed by a chairman activities
for a peasant who secures highest zMaximise community involvement in 
votes various activities for the betterment of
the village
zAct as a channel and support for Union 
zAdministration
zCollect revenue and taxes
Citizen Any number of Composed of voluntary zDevelopment and improvement of
Community individuals. A village members who elect a service delivery
Boards (CCBs) can have more than chairman, executive zWelfare and social activities
one CCB committee and a zCoordinating with NGOs
secretary, each for a zRaising funds
term of 2 years
Musalihat A total of 3 All members, including zResolve local disputes with the help of
Anjuman members the convener, are the union nazim
selected by the Insaaf zAct as a mediator for legal disputes
committee formed by zCourts can pass cases to the Musalihat 
the Union Council Anjuman and vice versa
School A total of 11 Selection by zExpansion and development of
Management members headmasters in informal education at grassroot level
Committees consultation with union zSupport for maintenance of school 
(SMCs) nazim/village influential facilities and management of funds
zMonitoring of teachers
zCoordinating with headmasters
Source Naqvi (2004).
a direct link of accountability between these patrons
and the union level citizenry will be created. It is also
hoped that accountability to the marginalised and
powerless will be further increased through the
mechanism of reservation of seats in the union
council for women, peasants and minorities.
These reforms have also changed the nature of
political bargaining over development funds. For one,
they have reduced the level at which the bargaining
over development funds used to take place. In the
previous system, the site of bargaining was the
province, whereas now it is the district and the tehsil.
More importantly, the reforms have dismantled the
old system where the local patron indirectly
bargained over development funds through higher
tier elected politicians. Under the new system, union
nazims and naib nazims can bargain directly with
district and tehsil nazims in their capacity as district
and tehsil councillors.4 This change empowers the
union nazim and naib nazim because they have
become critical providers of union level information
into the local government planning process.
These reforms have clearly sought to address
accountability failures in Pakistan’s political and
administrative structure. The extent to which they
have been successful in improving the quality and
provision of essential public services is examined in
the next section with the help of survey data.
4 Changes in post-reform provision
4.1 Sampling strategy
The focus of this article and our research is on rural
areas because of a higher incidence of poverty in
these areas and because, despite the fact that 70 per
cent of all Pakistanis live in rural areas, social service
provision has always been much worse in these parts
compared with urban areas. In choosing a case
district, we felt that it would be instructive to
analyse the impact of devolution in rural areas that
have seen considerable socioeconomic change as a
result of urbanisation and industrialisation. Therefore,
we chose a fieldwork site in Faisalabad, Punjab’s
second most industrialised and urbanised district.
Within Faisalabad, we chose Jaranwala tehsil because
it is dominated by peasant proprietors, rather than
large landlords and, therefore, can be expected to
have more competitive elections and more
responsive representatives. Within this tehsil, we
chose two rural unions that were close to major
market activity and opportunities for industrial and
service sector employment. More importantly, we
chose unions where the union nazim had won the
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2001 local government elections by an extremely
small margin so that we could expect the nazim to
be responsive to citizens on account of the threat of
being ousted by a small ‘vote swing’ in the next
elections. In order to maintain the confidentiality of
our respondents, we label the first union, ‘Case UC1’
and the second union, ‘Case UC2’.
In each of these unions, we surveyed two villages. The
first village chosen in each union was the elected
union nazim’s village because local interviews as well
as international literature (Besley et al. 2004) suggest
that locally elected mayors tend to oversupply their
own villages at the expense of other localities. We
refer to these villages as nazim Village 1 (in Case UC1)
and nazim Village 2 (in Case UC2). The second village
in each union was chosen on the basis of having the
least or no representation on the union council. These
villages are labelled non-nazim Village 1 (in Case UC1)
and non-nazim Village 2 (in Case UC2). In each village
we surveyed 22–30 per cent of households, which
gave a total sample of 364 households. The household
sample was randomly drawn and stratified according
to the biraderi5 composition of the village, based on
the fact that biraderis are considered good proxies for
social positions.6
4.2 Has the quality of healthcare improved?
State-provided healthcare is an important need
demanded by the citizens of our case unions. State-
provided Basic Health Units (BHUs) are in existence in
both our case unions and their provision was made
prior to the recent local government reforms. In line
with our concern in this article, we ask whether there
has been an improvement in the quality of health
provision by BHUs since the recent local government
reforms. We measure the quality of state-provided
healthcare along two dimensions. The first is doctor
attendance and the second is the availability of
medicines. In this regard, respondents were asked to
rank doctor attendance and medicine availability on a
scale that ranged from ‘1’ (no attendance or medicine
availability), to ‘5’ (regular attendance and availability).
Figure 2 shows that, across our sample villages,
90–100 per cent of our respondents who regularly
use the BHUs, report irregularity of doctor attendance
and medicine availability.7 This suggests that serious
shortfalls exist in the quality of state-provided
healthcare at the union level.
To gauge how local government reforms have
impacted the quality of state-provided healthcare, we
asked our respondents to rank changes in the quality
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Figure 3 Public vs. private healthcare use
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of the above indicators since local government
reforms. A score of ‘1’ reflects serious worsening, a
score of ‘3’ implies no change and a score of ‘5’ means
an improvement. Figure 2 shows that, across our
sample villages, 80–100 per cent of our respondents
who regularly use the BHUs report no change or a
worsening in the quality of healthcare8 since local
government reforms. Taken together, this analysis
suggests that the poor quality of healthcare, a pre-
devolution outcome, has persisted since the reform. 
Interestingly, nazim Villages 1 and 2 have fared almost
as badly as the two non-nazim villages. This indicates
that having a resident nazim makes no real difference
in the delivery of a universal service such as health. It
seems that villages that are well represented on the
union council, in this case by the top-most union
executive who is able to bargain at the district level,
are as badly off as villages that are poorly
represented (non-nazim Village 2) or not represented
at all (non-nazim Village 1). The reason why union
executives appear to be irrelevant to the provision of
universal services is analysed later in this article. 
A result of poor provision of state-provided
healthcare is that union level citizens are ‘voting with
their feet’ (going elsewhere) in favour of private
healthcare (Figure 3). Over 60 per cent of the
respondents in our sample villages suggested a
preference for private healthcare over state-provided
healthcare. Typically cited reasons for this preference
include better availability of doctors and medicines in
private clinics. This suggests that respondents are
discriminating in favour of private healthcare on the
basis of availability of medicines and doctors and not
on the quality of doctors or diagnosis. This reflects
the sheer poverty of state-provided healthcare in
Pakistan. Proximity to a health facility also plays a
part. The higher usage of a state-provided health
facility in nazim Villages 1 and 2 is heavily influenced
by the fact that both these villages are also the
headquarter villages of the union and, therefore,
they have a BHU. Such a facility is lacking in the
other two villages and is reflected in their lower
usage of state-run facilities and their higher usage of
private facilities.
Private healthcare as a solution, however, has a
number of problems associated with it. The most
important being access to quality private healthcare.
Figure 4 shows that 40–50 per cent of citizens
opting out of state-provided healthcare actually end
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Figure 4 Village private healthcare as a substitute for government Basic Health Units (BHUs)
up using village level private healthcare. Village level
interviews revealed that this system is run by
unqualified and untrained compounders and
medicine salesmen, and not by trained doctors.
Therefore, the poverty of the state-provided
healthcare system is forcing a large majority of
citizens to turn to poor-quality private healthcare. 
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that small farmers and
lower caste biraderis have a much higher reliance on
poor-quality village level private healthcare. Small
farmers in nazim Village 2 have a 26 per cent higher
chance of using village level private healthcare than
others in the village. Similarly, low caste biraderis in
our non-nazim villages, who are mostly labourers and
domestic servants, have a 14 per cent higher chance
of using village level private healthcare. In contrast,
belonging to the dominant biraderi in the village, that
is the biraderi of the village influential, reduces
reliance on village level private healthcare. Therefore,
the current system of state-provided healthcare is
largely penalising small farmers and lower caste
biraderis who clearly cannot afford to use the better
quality urban healthcare system available in the town
nearby. The elite biraderis are not as badly affected by
the poor provision of state-provided healthcare,
possibly because it is easier for them to substitute
urban private healthcare for union level state-
provided healthcare due to better information and/or
better resources. The failure of state-provided
healthcare at the union level is creating disparities of
access for socially and economically weaker groups
and no change is observable in the quality of state-
provided healthcare since the inception of the recent
local government reforms in our sample unions.
Cockcroft et al.’s (2005) findings for the country as a
whole support the findings in our case villages,
though they also find positive results for some
indicators of quality. First, satisfaction with state-
provided health services increased in three out of
four provinces between 2002 and 2004 (from
65 per cent to 68.6 per cent). An extremely positive
finding for decentralisation was the fact that users
were more likely to report satisfaction if the health
facility was directly monitored by the union nazim or
councillors. Second, more people felt that they had
access to state-provided health services in 2004
(76.6 per cent vs. 66.8 per cent in 2002). Third, more
people felt that they knew how to complain about
state-run health facilities (11.8 per cent in 2002 vs.
16.1 per cent in 2004) (Cockcroft et al. 2005: 77–84).
However, despite the increase in satisfaction, the use
of these facilities actually decreased according to the
survey (from 29.2 per cent in 2002 to 23.9 per cent
2004). As is the case in our villages, this decrease in
usage was particularly high in the ‘vulnerable and very
vulnerable’9 households, which were also less likely to
report satisfaction with the services they had access
to, compared with other groups. The decrease in use
occurred mostly in communities that were more than
5km from the nearest state-run health facility.
Another major reason for reduced use was the lack
of availability of medicine, which has remained an
acute problem, with less than 30 per cent reporting
that they received all their required medicines from
the facility, despite an improvement being reported
across 50 per cent of the facilities visited during this
survey (Cockcroft et al. 2005: 78–83). 
Two out of three users of state-provided health
facilities had to pay more for an entry ticket to
access the facility in 2004 than in 2002, and about
60 per cent of users said they paid more than twice
the official rate. This is another important reason for
why people are opting to use private health services,
usually run by unqualified practitioners, that are
available easily and cheaply within the village.
Interestingly, these were most popular in Punjab in
both years, with 35 per cent opting to use
unqualified practitioners in 2002, and 39.3 per cent
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Table 2 Dependence on village level private healthcare
Likelihood of using village level private
healthcare (%)
Village influentials' biraderi in all villages –13.5*
Small farmer and low caste biraderis in non-nazim villages 13.6**
Small farmer (<5 acres) in nazim's Village 2 26.6*
*Significant at 5% level. **Significant at 10% level.
opting to do so in 2004. The rate of satisfaction
reported for private practitioners was also much
higher than that reported for doctors in state-run
facilities. An important finding of the study is that
the decrease in the usage of state-run facilities is
almost exactly matched by the increase in the use of
unqualified practitioners, so that all those that opt
out of state facilities are going straight to unqualified
practitioners rather than to private, qualified doctors.
Unfortunately, our finding that the poverty of the
state-provided healthcare system is forcing a large
majority of citizens in our case villages to turn to
poor-quality private healthcare is true for the country
as a whole (Cockcroft et al. 2005: 78–81).
4.3 Has the quality of education improved?
Like state-provided healthcare, education is an
important need demanded by the citizens of our
case unions. Male and female state-run primary
schools are in existence in both our case unions, and
their provision was made prior to the recent local
government reforms. Between 70 and 100 per cent
of children attending primary schools in these villages
are using a government school, which means that
the quality of state provision will be an important
factor determining the future of the young in these
villages. In line with our methodology for healthcare,
we ask whether there has been an improvement in
the quality of state-provided primary education since
the recent local government reforms. We measure
the quality of state-provided primary education along
two dimensions. The first is teacher attendance and
the second is the condition of school buildings and
facilities. In this regard, respondents were asked to
rank teacher attendance and the condition of
buildings and facilities on a scale that ranged from ‘1’
(no attendance or dilapidated conditions) to ‘5’
(regular attendance and a well-functioning facility).
We present the results separately for girls’ and boys’
primary schools.
Government girls’ primary schools
Figure 5 shows that, across our sample villages,
70–95 per cent of our respondents who use
government primary girls’ schools report irregularity
of teacher attendance and a poor or unusable
condition of facilities.10 This underscores the poor
state of primary education provision at the local level.
To gauge how local government reforms have
impacted on the quality of state-provided girls’ primary
education, we asked our respondents to rank changes
in the quality of the above indicators since local
government reforms, on the same 1 to 5 scale.
Figure 5 shows that, across our sample villages, 90 per
cent of our respondents who are users of government
girls’ primary schools report no change or a worsening
in the quality of education11 since local government
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reforms. As in the case of health, taken together, this
analysis suggests that the poor quality of government-
provided girls’ primary education, a pre-devolution
outcome, has persisted since the reform. It is also
obvious, once again, that representation on the union
council appears to have no particular impact on the
provision of primary education services.
Government boys’ primary education
Unlike girls’ primary schooling, there is variation in
teacher attendance in government boys’ schools
between our two union councils, with Case UC1
doing much better than Case UC2 (Figure 6). The
number of respondents reporting infrequent teacher
attendance ranges between 90–100 per cent for our
two sample villages in Case UC2. However, the
picture regarding the condition of school facilities is
as dismal for government boys’ schools as it is for
government girls’ schools, with 70 per cent of
sample respondents reporting poor or unusable
facilities in all our sample villages. A majority of
respondents also report either ‘no change’ or
‘worsening’ in teacher attendance and the condition
of school facilities, since local government reforms.
Once again no changes are observable in the quality
of schooling indicators for these schools since the
reform, even though serious quality shortfalls exist in
these schools. Interestingly, unions do well or badly
as a whole, and representation on the union council
appears to have little impact on service delivery.
Once again, Cockcroft et al.’s (2005) survey findings
for Pakistan are not very different from those of our
case villages. There was no change in the satisfaction
with state-provided education reported in 2002
(54.1 per cent) and 2004 (53.3 per cent). In terms of
usage, however, unlike the health sector, more people
tend to use government schools than private schools,
though the latter experienced a relatively greater
increase in enrolment (Cockcroft et al. 2005: 88–90).
Looking at findings that are comparable with the
two main indicators of quality that we used in our
case villages – teacher attendance and the condition
of school buildings – we find that the quality of
teaching is suffering all over the country and that
there has been little change since the local
government reforms. Of all those that chose to send
their children to government schools, only 13.6 per
cent said that it was because of the quality of the
teachers, compared with 44.7 per cent of those that
chose private schools instead. Similarly, as far as the
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facilities were concerned, an even lower proportion
of parents who had chosen government schools
mentioned these as a deciding factor (4.4 per cent),
as opposed to 21.7 per cent of those whose children
were in private schools. The most compelling reason
for choosing a government school was proximity and
accessibility (43.6 per cent) and low fees and
incentives such as scholarships, free books and
uniforms (27.9 per cent) (Cockcroft et al. 2005: 94).
On the positive side, only 4.1 per cent said they had
no access to state-provided education in 2004,
compared with 7.4 per cent in 2002, indicating a
possible increase in services between these years. This
is supported by an overall increase in the perception
of access in all four provinces. However, proximity to
a government school was correlated with higher
satisfaction only in the case of government girls’
schools, which is an intuitively obvious finding, given
that we found that parents are unwilling to send
daughters to attend schools in other villages. Like
Cockcroft et al. (2005), we too found that not being
able to send their daughters to school within their
own village was a very significant complaint of many
respondents, and that while boys had the option of
attending school in nearby villages, the lack of a girls’
school in a village, or the existence of one with poor
teaching quality, meant that girls may not get
educated at all (Cockcroft et al. 2005: 88–90). 
Our research shows that the poor-quality provision of
universal services adversely affects the lives of not only
ordinary citizens but also differentially affects the lives
of girls, small landholders and low caste biraderis in our
sample villages. Girls are worse off because the
shortfall in teacher attendance is much more severe in
government girls’ schools than it is in government boys’
schools, and because they do not have alternative
options. Small landowners and low caste biraderis are
worse off because they lack access to urban private
healthcare and their only available response to declining
state healthcare provision is to switch to low-quality
village level private healthcare. They do not have the
luxury to effectively ‘vote with their feet’ in the face of
declining quality of state healthcare.
5 Conclusion
The results presented above on the provision of
health and education services show that
decentralisation has not led to any real improvement
in the provision or the quality of these services. Our
initial premise was that Pakistan’s social development
has suffered due to accountability failures, and that
since LGO 2001 explicitly sought to address these,
we would expect to find that service delivery has
improved. Why, then, has this not happened?
It is instructive at this point to compare the delivery
of targeted services, such as sanitation and
sewerage, with that of universal services, such as
education and health, in our case villages. The same
survey that we used to assess health and education
changes also checked for the provision of and
change in the quality of sanitation drains. Figure 7
shows that there has been an impressive change in
government-provided sanitation to households since
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the reforms. State-provided cement drain services to
households has increased by approximately 28 per
cent over the pre-reform level. This is largely because
of an increased availability of funds and that union
executives now have a voice in the determination of
district council development funds.
While this increase is impressive, it unfortunately
indicates that the old tendency of government to
concentrate on the provision of targeted services in
the face of declining quality of universal services is
continuing. Worse still, Figure 8 shows that when
this increase in provision is disaggregated by nazim
and non-nazim villages, the increase has occurred
almost entirely in the villages where the nazim is
resident. Over 40 per cent of the households in the
nazim villages have been provided drains post-local
government reforms as opposed to only 14 per cent
of the households in the non-nazim villages.
It appears that in the case of targeted services having a
strong representation on the union council, or at least
a resident nazim, makes the difference. Interestingly,
the provision deficit comparison between the nazim
and non-nazim villages was not large prior to the
reform, even though overall provision was low in all
villages12 (Figure 8). This indicates that the tendency
towards parochial targeting has been exacerbated
post-reform. However, why are union nazims willing
to provide targeted goods to their own villages but
ignore the same constituency when it comes to the
delivery of universal goods?
The answer to this question is provided, partially, by
the literature on elite capture, which holds that
decentralisation in polarised societies can lead to the
over-provision of targeted goods to local elite groups
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Besley et al. 2004).
This literature is useful in analysing local politics in
our case villages. We found that nazims cater
essentially to their own factions and that these are
village-specific and do not transcend the boundaries
of their own villages to encompass factions in other
villages of the union (Cheema and Mohmand 2006).
This may explain why union nazims may be tempted
to concentrate all benefits within their own villages.
These factions are also not inclusive of a wide cross-
section of the village population as they are formed
on the basis of biraderi alliances, so that nazims are
more prone to provide services that can be targeted
to specific groups, that are tangible and visible, and
that are directly attributable to them. This allows
them to reward their own factions and to appear to
prioritise them over all others in order to retain their
support. This is not possible in the case of universal
services, improvements which are not only less
visible and obvious, but also cannot be easily targeted
to specific groups. Therefore, while the delivery of
targeted services has increased under the new
decentralised system, delivery of universal services
has not increased because electoral accountability of
the local influentials has not increased. Citizens are as
yet unable to hold local level service providers
accountable, either indirectly through their
representatives or directly through participation in
citizen monitoring and oversight bodies. 
Our interviews with union council nazims in our case
unions, however, suggest that nazims were fully
cognisant of the poor quality of universal services
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and of the failure of the system to improve quality
post-local government reforms. In the view of the
union council nazims, the failure of accountability
does not reside at the union level but at the district
level. They pointed out that the union is a unit that
enjoys little decision-making power vis-à-vis the
district and tehsil and therefore cannot affect
decisions taken at that level. The responsiveness of
the union nazim is severely curtailed by the fact that
he/she has limited authority over the delivery of
universal services. The level that can take decisions
regarding these services – the district and to a lesser
extent the tehsil – is de-linked from citizens and thus
has little perception of their needs. This is because
little has changed in the administrative procedures of
accountability and because elected higher tier nazims
are governed by the imperatives of a system of
indirect elections. Both the district and tehsil nazims
are elected by union councillors and not by the tehsil
or district citizens. Therefore, the agents in charge of
accountability of local service providers have no
direct link with citizens that require these services.
Furthermore, indirect elections imply that district
and tehsil nazims need to be responsive only to their
own very limited direct constituency of about 1,200
councillors and not to the larger citizenry. The
electoral incentives provided to higher tier politicians
may provide another important reason for weak
accountability of local level service providers and why
the quality of universal services continues to suffer
post-reform.
Union nazims also point out a number of structural
constraints that inhibit them from holding local level
service providers accountable. They stress that local
government reforms have not been complemented
by bureaucratic reforms below the district level. The
chain of bureaucratic accountability below the office
of the Executive District Officer (EDO)13 has not
altered post-local government reforms. Therefore,
union nazims, who are directly accountable to local
citizens, do not have the power to discipline a local
level teacher, doctor, nurse, etc. As a result, there is a
disjuncture between their accountability to local level
citizens and their authority to hold local level service
providers accountable. In order to do the latter, union
level nazims have to work through the office of the
district nazim, which turns into a costly exercise
because of the effort involved in having their voice
heard within the district nazim and the EDO’s office.
As they point out, these offices receive many such
complaints every day and there is no mechanism in
the system that forces either the district nazim or
his/her EDO to respond to the union nazims’
complaints. Both the union nazims of our two case
unions had lodged repeated complaints with the
district government regarding the poor performance
of local level service providers in charge of the
maintenance and provision of state-provided health
and education services but had received no response.
Furthermore, they argue that the distance of the
EDO’s office from the locality makes it difficult for
the citizen to accurately assess the real cause of poor
quality and as a result, the union nazim’s office bears
the stigma of poor-quality provision.
As far as the role of the newly formed citizen
participation bodies is concerned, there was a
consensus between citizens and union nazims
regarding the poor performance of school councils
(SCs) in holding local level service providers
accountable. SCs are post-reform school level parent
oversight bodies, which have the authority to monitor
teachers. SCs were operational in all government
primary schools in our case unions. However, in spite
of the consensus between them, citizens and union
nazims gave diametrically opposite reasons for the
poor performance of SCs. In the citizens’ view, the
process through which parents were selected as
members of SCs was prone to interference by the
union nazim and the head teacher. In their view, this
made SCs partisan and weak as mechanisms of
oversight and accountability. In contrast was the union
nazim’s view, that biraderi and/or factional divisions
within the villages were played out within the SCs.
These divisions were argued to extinguish the
effectiveness of SCs as oversight bodies with this
factional strife weakening them as mechanisms
through which local service providers could be held
accountable. Village level factional strife may also
explain why villagers find it hard to unify and organise
collective action around issues of poor-quality
universal public service provision.
Based on all of these factors, LGO 2001, despite
aiming to correct accountability failures in Pakistan’s
administrative and political systems, has not yet
managed to achieve this aim. This article has
attempted to rigorously measure the impact of
Pakistan’s recent local government reforms on
changes in the quality of service provision, and found
that while the provision of targeted services has
increased, the reforms have not been able to
improve the quality or provision of universal services.
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 1  January 2007 57
This may be because the reforms are still recent and
may need time to correct many of these failures. It
could also be because the implementation of fiscal
decentralisation has not happened, funds are
extremely limited at the local level, and the incentive
for capture is high. However, the analysis presented
in this section points out that the problems are not
simply those of incomplete implementation but,
instead, lie to a large extent on administrative
procedures and the structure of the local
government plan. Therefore, these need to be
reformed in order to correct accountability failures
and to improve social service provision in rural Pakistan.
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Notes
1 These figures for the tehsil and district do not
include the 6,022 union nazims in the district
councils and 6,022 union naib nazims in the tehsil
councils to avoid double counting.
2 During the 2001 elections and the first term of
local government, each union council had 19
members. A total of 12 were elected on general
seats (of which four were reserved for women); six
were elected on reserved labour/peasant seats (of
which two were reserved for women); and one
was elected on a reserved religious minority seat.
However, these were reduced to 13 seats for the
second round of local government elections in
August–September 2005, so that they now stand
at six general seats (of which two are reserved for
women); four reserved labour/peasant seats (of
which two are reserved for women); and one
reserved religious minority seat.
3 All union councillors, union nazims and union naib
nazims are directly elected. Tehsil and district
nazims and naib nazims, and tehsil and district
councillors on reserved seats are indirectly elected
by union councillors.
4 Union nazims are ex-officio members of the
district council and union naib nazims are ex-officio
members of the tehsil council.
5 Hierarchically ordered, patrilineal kinship groups that
retain an element of the occupational caste system.
6 This sampling strategy, though central to our
research, is not entirely relevant to the results
presented in this article, since we do not analyse
the delivery of universal services at the level of
the household. Its relevance is presented in the
findings of a complementary paper on targeted
service delivery by Cheema and Mohmand (2006).
7 A score of 3 or below.
8 A score of 3 or below.
9 Defined as a household with ‘poor roof construction,
high room occupancy and poor occupation of main
breadwinner’ (Cockcroft et al. 2002: viii).
10 A score of 3 or below.
11 A score of 3 or below.
12 Since the baseline data for new delivery was
based on recall, there is the distinct possibility
that our respondents classified dysfunctional
drains as no delivery pre-devolution. Care was
taken to control for this but this bias remains in
our data to an extent.
13 The district bureaucracy is led by the District
Coordination Officer (DCO), to whom an EDO
for each of the district level services reports
directly. The highest district bureaucrat for any
particular service is, therefore, the EDO.
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